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Promoting Scholarship that Matters: The Uselessness 
of Useful Research and the Usefulness of Useless 
Research 
 
Our ambition in this essay is to challenge received wisdoms about 
the importance of “useful” management scholarship. Suggesting 
that usefulness and uselessness are contingent on issues of 
temporality and power, we advocate caution in assigning terms 
such as useful and relevant – they are inherently problematic, we 
argue, and should be viewed more as ideology than as empirical 
statements.  We conclude by a call for reflexivity about what it is 
we are doing when we do “useful” research, along with a greater 
concern for the values for which business schools stand. 
 
Keywords: Business schools, contingent, power, reflexivity, relevance, 
temporality, usefulness. 
 
Forthcoming in: British Journal of Management 
 
Authors: Mark Learmonth, Andy Lockett and Kevin Dowd. 
 
Accepted for publication: 9th May 2011 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In this essay we seek to provoke 
debate by questioning an 
increasingly received orthodoxy in 
business schools: that 
management education and 
research should be ‘useful’ 
(Baldridge, Floyd and Markóczy, 
2004; Starkey and Madan, 2001). 
Not that we are defending 
uselessness – we want to promote 
‘scholarship that matters’ 
(Őzbilgin, 2010). What we aim to 
do, however, is to question 
orthodox ideas about the uses and 
application of business schools’ 
outputs; orthodox ideas, we 
believe, that are becoming so 
taken-for-granted that their 
influence is increasingly 
dysfunctional. Such taken-for-
granted ideas, which, in this essay 
we trace back primarily to a 
complex set of inter-relations of 
power, risk dangerously 
constraining the range of activities 
deemed legitimate within business 
schools (Ford, Harding and 
Learmonth, 2010).  Indeed, a wider 
manifestation of these 
assumptions can be seen in the 
British government’s current policy 
of funding higher education 
teaching only in science and 
technology – subjects they deem to 
be ‘useful’. 
Provoking debate of this kind is 
becoming increasingly important 
for us, personally.  Today, as 
business school academics, there 
are growing pressures on us to 
produce work deemed by others to 
be ‘useful’, ‘impact-ful’, ‘relevant’ 
and so on.  These pressures are 
increasingly upon us, not least 
because of the changing ways in 
which our work is assessed and 
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valued in the UK’s Research 
Excellence Framework (REF) 
proposals (Lipsett, 2011) as well as 
in other, broader cultural changes 
that influence how academic work 
is measured and appreciated 
within wider society.  We feel such 
changes are already beginning to 
alter the nature of the research we 
would consider doing; sometimes, 
they are even making us wonder 
whether the more our work is 
judged ‘useful’ in the terms of 
measures used in the REF, the less 
our work might actually matter to 
us. It is for partly personal 
reasons, then, that the examples 
we have chosen to illustrate our 
points later in the essay (the 
supposed usefulness of finance 
research and the supposed 
uselessness of deconstruction) 
represent topics of personal 
interest for two of us.  The 
usefulness (or otherwise) of these 
modes of research are matters in 
which we have directly personal 
stakes.  
We see this essay, therefore, in 
part, as a personal and reflexive 
exploration (Alvesson and 
Skõldberg, 2000; Cunliffe, 2003; 
2004) of the paradoxes 
surrounding usefulness and 
uselessness.  But it is also, more 
broadly, an exploration of what we 
are doing when we do research, 
why we might be doing it, and how 
our work fits in to the power 
relations within academic life – 
power relations to which we are 
subjected and, to which we no 
doubt contribute.  Thus, we aim to 
add to the ongoing debate about 
the appropriate nature of business 
school scholarship (Currie, Knights 
and Starkey, 2010; Ferlie, McGiven 
and De Moraes, 2010); and we do 
so principally by arguing that 
terms such as 
relevance/usefulness are in 
themselves inherently problematic.  
Indeed, we seek to take the debate 
beyond the issue of whether or not 
scholarship should be useful, to 
questioning what lies behind the 
various constructions of 
useful/useless that are deployed in 
the debates. The intent, then, is to 
become better informed about how 
the manner in which we frame 
‘usefulness’ affects the ways in 
which we might endeavour to 
attend to it.  
In developing these arguments 
we focus on two key arguments. 
First, we suggest that ideas about 
usefulness are contingent upon 
time (Antonacopoulou and 
Tsoukas, 2002; Augier and March, 
2007).  What counts as useful is 
influenced by the changeable fads 
of management fashions and 
ideologies (Abrahamson, 1991; 
Barley and Kunda, 1992; Lowrie 
and Willmott, 2006) as well as on 
cultural and technological shifts in 
wider society. In other words, even 
(what is conventionally regarded 
as) uselessness may sometimes 
turn out, in time, to have its uses. 
A famous example from another 
discipline was the work of the great 
Cambridge mathematician, G. H. 
Hardy, who towards the end of his 
life lamented on the uselessness of 
his life’s work on pure 
mathematics (Hardy, 1940), and 
who did not live to see it become a 
key element in the development of 
modern computing. The converse 
of this phenomenon is equally 
important to us – we show how 
things that are deemed useful in 
the short run can turn out, over 
time, to be deemed useless (or 
worse).  
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Second, we argue that 
usefulness is also contingent upon 
relations of power. Useful 
management scholarship is 
commonly that which those with 
the power to make judgments 
about it (e.g. business executives 
or government funding bodies) 
believe is valuable to their interests 
or constituencies; activities that do 
not serve these purposes are then 
dismissed as useless. In other 
words, we are suggesting that 
usefulness has an ideological 
dimension in the Marxian sense; 
which is to say that the dominant 
version of “usefulness” currently in 
vogue within business schools has 
been socially and historically 
constructed to serve the interests 
of elites, but it has widely come to 
be seen as necessary, natural, self-
evident and unquestionable 
(Alvesson and Deetz, 1996).  So, 
for example, as a recent editorial in 
the Academy of Management 
Journal (Bamberger and Pratt, 
2010) points out, it is very hard to 
publish work about non-managers 
in most management journals, 
especially those non-managers 
who are in marginal groups within 
organizations.  In part, according 
to Bamberger and Pratt (2010, 
p.666), this is because ‘such 
research can be viewed as “too 
weird” or too far outside of what 
people consider appropriate for 
management research’.  But the 
‘people’ doing the considering in 
this context, are presumably those 
who have the power to make their 
judgments count. 
Our analyses of the contingent 
nature of usefulness then, leads us 
not so much to disagree with the 
conclusions of Van de Ven and 
Johnson (2006, p. 803), for whom 
the work of business schools 
increasingly ‘needs to achieve the 
dual objectives of applied use and 
advancing fundamental 
understanding’; rather our 
analysis leads us to stress that 
what constitutes ‘applied use’ is 
much more complex, paradoxical 
and unstable than is often 
assumed (Aleroff and Knights, 
2009; Knights, 2008; Rasche and 
Behnam, 2009). One reason, 
perhaps, for the ideal continuing to 
prove so elusive. 
To show how our interpretation 
of usefulness might apply to 
contemporary business schools, we 
then consider two contrasting 
approaches to management 
scholarship. One that has widely 
been seen (until recently) to 
exemplify the height of usefulness: 
modern finance; the other, often 
vilified as useless: deconstruction. 
We conclude with the suggestion 
that a key issue in any debate 
about the usefulness of the work of 
business schools is the very thing 
which often gets occluded in 
discussions of themes such as 
engagement, relevance and 
usefulness: the values and 
ideologies for which we wish our 
institutions to stand 
(Antonacopoulou, 2010). 
 
The Useful Debate 
One aspect of usefulness – the 
rigour-relevance debate – is well 
established in management 
research; the traditional argument 
being that there is a trade-off 
between rigour and relevance. 
Indeed, debates about the purpose 
of business school scholarship 
have often tended to polarize 
around ideas about ‘the soldiers of 
organizational performance and 
the priests of research purity’ 
(March and Sutton, 1997, p. 703; 
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and see Peng and Dess, 2010, for a 
review of the competing camps). 
The former have sought to define 
the relevance/usefulness of 
business school scholarship with 
reference to its effects on 
improving organizational 
performance. For them, 
scholarship should be ‘concerned 
with knowledge as it works in 
practice in the context of 
application’ (Starkey and Madan, 
2001, p. s5; see also Das, 2003). In 
contrast, the priests of research 
purity have argued that inside the 
proverbial “ivory tower,” scholars 
are, by definition, not supposed to 
be relevant or useful (Kieser and 
Leiner, 2009; March and Reed, 
2000; Peng and Dess, 2010). 
More recently a new hybrid 
position is emerging, wherein the 
liberal virtues of the traditional 
university are linked to (market) 
relevance (Lowrie and Willmott, 
2006). Thus, today, many 
management scholars are arguing 
that rigour and relevance are not 
mutually exclusive (Bartunek and 
Rynes, 2010; Gulati, 2007; Rynes, 
2007; Van de Ven, 2007). These 
kinds of arguments suggest that 
research can be rigorous and 
relevant, and that ‘by probing more 
deeply into the problems and other 
issues that managers care about, 
we can naturally align our 
interests with more practice-
relevant research, without 
sacrificing rigor.’ (Gulati, 2007, 
p.780).  Gulati outlines five 
different practices that will enable 
researchers to bridge the divide 
between rigour and relevance.  One 
such practice, for example, states 
that managerial sensibilities 
should shape research questions. 
Here Gulati draws on Lawrence’s 
(1992) notion of “problem-oriented” 
research, or work that focuses on 
real-world managerial challenges: 
‘[o]ur subjects [i.e. managers] can 
tell us what needs to be studied—
where our theories and knowledge 
are inadequate’ (Lawrence, 1992, 
p.140). A second example from 
Gulati (2007, p.780) relates to 
testing theory in the classroom, 
where he argues that ‘most 
business school students and 
business executives we teach in 
our burgeoning executive 
education programs are past, 
current, and/or future managers, 
so there is no better group on 
which to test the relevance and 
potential value of theoretical 
concepts.’   
In other words, for Gulati and 
others in similar traditions, by 
bringing academics and managers 
together to foster dialogue and 
shape the focus of research 
activity, academics will produce 
more “relevant” research. For these 
scholars, the relevance gap is 
bridged by moving from a so-called 
Mode 1 form of scholarly 
endeavour, where the knowledge 
production is academic and 
discipline led, to Mode 2, where 
knowledge production is problem 
focused and interdisciplinary (see: 
Gibbons et al., 1994). Under Mode 
2, knowledge is co-produced 
through interaction between the 
user and the academic, and 
therefore has greater applied use.  
For us, however, one of the 
major problems with this kind of 
argument is that terms such as 
“relevance” and “use” are employed 
unproblematically. But as Weick 
(2001, p.s71), suggests, the much 
lamented relevance gap persists 
because we tend to ‘forget that ‘the’ 
real world is actually ‘a’ world that 
is idiosyncratic, egocentric and 
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unique to each person complaining 
about relevance.’ Simply stated, 
people see relevance in different 
ways. Thus, relevance for Weick, 
as for us, is inherently contestable 
and, as such, should not be 
treated as an unproblematic 
concept.  
Interestingly, and keying into a 
wider debate surrounding Science 
Technology and Society (STS), the 
term co-production (or co-
evolution) has been used as 
shorthand for the proposition that 
the ways in which we know and 
represent the world (both nature 
and society) are inseparable from 
the ways in which we choose to live 
in it (Jasanoff, 2004). STS scholars 
therefore view the descriptions of 
Mode 1 and Mode 2 research as 
being overly simplistic, and as 
presenting a normative and 
political ideology of how research 
should be done (see Godin, 1998; 
Shin, 2002). The STS view of co-
production critiques the realist 
ideology that persistently separates 
the domains of nature, facts, 
objectivity, reason and policy from 
those of culture, values, 
subjectivity, emotion and politics 
(Jasanoff, 2004). Drawing on the 
breadth of social science 
perspectives, STS scholars who 
focus on the co-production of 
knowledge, have highlighted (not 
exhaustively) the importance of 
power, authority and subjectivity 
to our understanding of scientific 
knowledge production and 
consumption in society. As such, 
the STS perspective on co-
production brings into sharp relief 
the tensions that may arise 
between the producers and 
consumers of research.  
 
Temporality, Power and the 
Role of the Business School 
Inspired especially by these 
wider debates in STS, we develop 
further the idea that terms like 
relevance and usefulness are 
inherently problematic.  As they 
can only ever be subjectively 
defined, their use necessarily 
raises the question, ‘who gets to 
define usefulness?’  A question, of 
course, that takes us back to 
power – one of the issues with 
which we started this essay. Thus, 
in adding to the STS literature, we 
argue that attempts to classify 
something as useful or useless are 
necessarily contingent both on the 
time period over which use is being 
defined – as well as upon relations 
of power – the dominant ideology 
through which scholarship comes 
to be counted as useful (or 
useless).  
From a temporal perspective, 
research that is pursued purely 
out of academic curiosity, without 
a specific applied use in mind may, 
as Flexner (1939, p. 544) famously 
commented, nevertheless prove 
‘unexpectedly [to be] the source 
from which undreamed-of utility is 
derived’ (Flexner, 1939, p. 544). 
(For discussions of this ideas as 
applied to business school 
activities, see for example: Grey 
(2001) and Kilduff and Kelemen 
(2001).) However, even were 
scholars to become fully aware of 
the contingent and unstable 
nature of usefulness from the point 
of view of time, because of power 
relations, the short-run attractions 
of pursuing usefulness would 
nevertheless remain extremely 
seductive – indeed, they are 
becoming hegemonic. Demon-
strating “usefulness” (or relevance) 
is increasingly important to attract 
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resources (e.g. donors, funders, 
and students) and is also an 
important criterion for the review 
of submissions to many scholarly 
journals. Thus, as Willmott (2003, 
p. 137) argues: 
 
Increasingly, universities 
are directly or indirectly 
dependent upon industry 
to support or sponsor 
research (and teaching) 
activity. ... For 
academics, 
demonstrating the 
relevance of universities 
for meeting ‘the needs of 
industry’ improves the 
prospect of attracting 
funding from the state as 
well as private sector 
sponsors. 
 
In essence, then, academics in 
business schools are in a double-
bind.  On the one hand, we must 
do work that is deemed useful to 
gain legitimacy from key powerful 
stakeholders who are influential in 
allocating resource and rewards. 
However, if business schools 
exclusively pursue (so-called) 
useful work they may end up 
becoming useless in the long-run. 
Without (so-called) useless 
activities there will be nothing to 
create ‘movement’ within the field. 
Below, we illustrate some of the 
dangers of supposed usefulness as 
well as the attractions of supposed 
uselessness by contrasting two 
contemporary bodies of theory in 
management studies – finance and 
deconstruction.  
 
 
 
 
Modern Finance: The epitome of the 
uselessness of usefulness 
 
It was widely argued – at least 
until recently – that the most 
useful domain of research 
emanating from Business Schools 
(as defined by the extent of the 
direct application of research by 
practitioners) was finance (AACSB, 
2008; Currie, Starkey and Knights, 
2010; Starkey and Tiratsoo, 2007). 
This subject originated in the 
1950s: its essence was to apply 
quantitative methods (often 
colloquially known as rocket 
science) to financial problems. (For 
more on this subject, and on its 
usefulness, see, e.g., Taleb 2008; 
Triana, 2009; Dowd and 
Hutchinson, 2010.) At least to 
certain elites, finance promised the 
benefits of better valuation, higher 
financial returns, lower risks and 
greater financial stability – indeed, 
several professors of Finance have 
been honoured with the Nobel 
Prize for Economics over the years. 
Yet almost every major 
development in this area illustrates 
how supposedly useful financial 
research has turned out, given 
time, to be useless.  
Perhaps the most apt current 
example1 following the recent 
                                                 
1
 Amongst other examples of finance 
research that was initially received as 
useful (indeed, several of their inventors 
have been honoured with the Nobel Prize 
for Economics) are the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model, the Modigliani-Miller 
theorem on firm capital structure, and the 
Black-Scholes theory of option valuation. 
The first of these was discredited in the 
early 1990s, and the credibility of the 
remaining two has taken repeated 
beatings: Modigliani-Miller was a key 
factor in the growth of excess leverage (or 
risk taking), which was a major 
contributory factor to the recent crisis; for 
their part, unreliable options valuations 
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financial collapse is Collateralised 
Debt Obligations (CDOs), in which 
pools of bank assets (such as 
mortgages) would be assembled 
and then claims on those assets 
sold off to investors. These claims 
would be tranched (or ranked in 
terms of seniority), so that senior 
tranches only took losses after the 
junior ones had been wiped out. In 
theory, a CDO could be composed 
of rubbish quality assets, and yet 
the tranching ensured that the 
senior tranches were very safe – a 
kind of financial alchemy; at the 
same time, the creation of CDOs 
was widely hailed as enabling 
borrowers with poor credit ratings 
to obtain mortgages they could not 
otherwise have obtained, subprime 
being an obvious example. 
However, when CDOs were first 
mooted the market was held back 
by the absence of a suitable model 
to value these securities and 
assess their risks. The 
breakthrough came with a 
landmark paper by David X. Li 
(2000), which proposed to value 
CDOs using a model known as a 
Gaussian copula, which could be 
calibrated using historical data on 
defaults. The publication of the 
Gaussian copula (even though its 
publication was in an academic 
journal) was received by finance 
practitioners as supremely useful.  
It allowed the CDO market to take 
off: by 2008, the size of the CDO 
market in the US had grown to 
over $10 trillion dollars or just over 
70% of US gross domestic product. 
Dr. Li himself was soon regarded 
as a potential Nobelist. 
                                                                      
have been a recurrent feature in the long 
catalogue of financial scandals of the last 
25 years. 
 
From the perspective of the 
short run interests of the powerful 
within the financial sector, the 
“usefulness” of CDOs appeared to 
be enormous. Borrowers got better 
access to finance, whereas 
investors got access to new types 
of investment assets and the 
prospect of higher returns and 
greater risk diversification.  With 
the passage of time and new events 
emerging, however, this apparent 
usefulness turned out somewhat 
differently.  Large numbers of 
borrowers were unable to repay 
and lost their homes, whilst 
investors lost vast amounts on 
CDO portfolios whose values 
collapsed in 2007-2009: ‘supersafe’ 
CDOs turned out to be supertoxic. 
It also turned out that the model 
gave unreliable valuations and risk 
assessments because the historical 
data used did not encompass any 
major housing downturn – and 
thus the ultra sophisticated Li 
model was blind to the most 
important risk involved.  The 
market for these financial 
‘products’ grew to enormous size 
not just because participants failed 
to appreciate their dangers. The 
key driver was financiers’ short-
term interests in profits: these 
securities were extremely lucrative 
for those who designed and sold 
them, and for the senior bank 
managements who lived off the 
profits that the designers and 
salespeople generated. Also 
complicit were the ratings 
agencies, which were driven by the 
same short-term profit 
considerations to give dubious 
securitizations highly inflated 
ratings: if the market collapsed 
later on, that was not their 
concern.  
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We suggest, therefore, that this 
aspect of finance provides an 
exemplar of the unstable and 
paradoxical nature of “usefulness”. 
Prior to the financial crisis, the 
usefulness claimed for CDOs was 
more or less axiomatic – largely 
because, as we can now see, its 
“usefulness” to elites rendered the 
theory on which CDOs were built 
immune to serious questioning.  
But it was this supreme 
“usefulness” that itself led to 
disaster in the longer run.  Had the 
model been seen as less useful, the 
prospects of academic critique 
exposing its weaknesses before it 
could do too much damage would 
have been higher, because there 
would have been fewer powerful 
voices with an interest in making 
sure any critique got ignored.  It 
was, paradoxically then, its very 
“usefulness” that meant what 
happened instead was that the 
weaknesses of the model were only 
exposed by a disastrous market 
downturn. Today, the seriousness 
of the financial crisis that CDOs 
caused has had the effect of 
realigning power relations to some 
extent at least – financiers’ 
definitions of the usefulness of 
such products are no longer quite 
so hegemonic.  However, with the 
benefit of a longer run perspective, 
most of us would now prefer such 
power realignment to have 
happened rather earlier than it did! 
 
Deconstruction: The usefulness of 
uselessness? 
 
Deconstruction, associated with 
the thinking of the French 
philosopher Jacques Derrida, has 
yet to be widely received as useful 
for management. We use it as an 
illustrative comparison rather than 
a direct one, in that deconstruction 
stands in stark contrast to finance 
research, having met with more 
than its fair share of ad hominem 
attacks, both in management 
circles (see Kilduff and Mehra, 
1997 for a discussion), as well as 
in its home discipline of philosophy 
(Derrida, 1995, p. 419-20). 
Typically, Derrida’s ad hominem 
critics accuse deconstruction of a 
nihilism that threatens to 
undermine rationality and ethics.  
However, as Kilduff argues, 
deconstruction ‘is used, not to 
abolish truth, science, logic, and 
philosophy, but to question how 
these concepts are present in texts 
and how they are employed to 
systematically exclude certain 
categories of thought and 
communication’ (1993, p.15; see 
also Cooper, 1989; Jones, 2004). 
Deconstruction is particularly 
interesting in the context of 
management scholarship, 
therefore, because it aims to 
produce a tension between what a 
text purports to claim (its intended 
meaning) and a double or multiple 
range of meanings that cannot be 
contained within the text’s 
intended meaning (Critchley, 
2005).  In other words, 
deconstruction offers management 
scholars possibilities for re-reading 
our discipline’s established facts 
and taken-for-granted 
assumptions, in order to start to 
see their paradoxes, blind spots 
and double-binds (McQuillan, 
2000).  Indeed, the revealing of 
paradox, or rather, the revealing of 
aporia (paradoxes which are 
logically irresolvable and therefore 
have to remain excluded and 
unquestioned for arguments to 
appear coherent) is a key 
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contribution in Derrida’s work 
(Derrida, 1993).   
Deconstruction also provides 
another example of the unstable 
and paradoxical nature of 
usefulness (or in this case, 
perhaps, uselessness).  This is 
because one might speculate that 
some of the vilification 
deconstruction has received for its 
uselessness is symptomatic of the 
deeper anxieties suffered by those 
people who enjoy the power 
necessary to get their criticisms of 
deconstruction taken seriously (cf. 
Vince, 2010). After all, it is meant 
to be radically subversive to 
dominant interests (including, for 
the purposes of this paper, 
business executives, government 
funding agencies and so on). On 
the other hand, however, as one 
way of posing the question, ‘useful 
for whom?’ its emphasis on the 
marginalized and unspoken has 
provided a “useful” inspiration for 
a number of radicals within 
management studies (Boje, 1995; 
Learmonth, 2005; Martin, 1990; 
Weitzner, 2007) in championing 
the interest of people who have 
little or no power in society.  
Deconstruction, then, might also 
be seen as a potential antidote to 
some of the blind spots in finance 
research, as well as to the self-
interests of people like the 
financiers whose main concern 
was to make a quick profit.   
Furthermore, deconstruction 
and other radical ideas are useful 
for their potential to create 
movement within systems of 
thought that otherwise are taken 
for granted.  In the sub-field of 
strategy, for example, Rasche has 
recently found deconstruction 
useful for providing an encounter 
with those paradoxes inherent 
within strategy-making ‘which 
must be overlooked to make 
[strategy’s] dominant logics seem 
undeconstructible’ (2008, p.116). 
But, while his work may well be 
subversive to strategy’s established 
truths, it is this very feature that 
promises to be useful in the long 
run, in that its subversiveness 
holds out the promise of 
reinvigorating the sub-discipline. A 
reinvigoration achieved through 
nurturing radically new forms of 
theoretical reflection, while 
fundamentally challenging our 
currently taken-for-granted 
assumptions and beliefs.  
Nevertheless, there are unlikely 
to be obvious short-run gains to be 
had from such challenges – one of 
the reasons why deconstruction 
continues to run the risk of getting 
dismissed as useless.  However, 
without the sort of reinvigoration 
deconstruction can provide, in the 
long-run, strategy risks falling into 
a dogmatic slumber (or into 
Bettis’s [1991, p.315] famous 
‘straightjacket’ perhaps) that will 
ultimately threaten the field’s 
capacity to be useful – to 
practitioners or to anyone else. 
Indeed, today, many now wish that 
finance research had also received 
such challenges – before it was too 
late!  And yet of course, ideas such 
as deconstruction will only survive 
in business schools if they remain 
liberal institutions that encourage 
questioning and debate – with no 
over-riding concerns for use. 
 
Conclusions: Towards  
Scholarship that Matters 
What have we learnt from this 
exploration of some of the 
complexities, paradoxes and 
instabilities of “usefulness” and 
“uselessness”?  Does it get us any 
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closer to producing scholarship 
that matters? 
We started the essay by voicing 
disquiet about the effects on our 
own scholarship of the REF and 
other changes to the way academic 
work is judged.  Like Grey (2001, 
p.s32), our ideal is now to be able 
to re-imagine usefulness and 
relevance and to see ourselves 
‘working with all the complexities 
of knowledge, free from the 
demands of relevance – or, more 
accurately, free from the current 
restricted, persecuted and 
persecutory imaginations of what 
relevance might be.’ In pursuit of 
this ideal, our central insight in 
the paper – that terms like 
“usefulness” and “uselessness”, 
“relevance” and “irrelevance” are 
always relational, never absolute – 
has proved helpful in suggesting 
practical ways forward.  For 
instance, one thing we can 
practically do when we argue 
about “usefulness” and 
“uselessness” is always to use 
them in conjunction with 
appropriate caveats – to put the 
terms, as it were, in “scare quotes” 
– to remind us of the complexities 
and instabilities, values and 
ideologies on which assumptions 
about usefulness and relevance are 
necessarily based.  The alternative 
– using these terms in ways that 
imply they are absolutes – is 
necessarily to impose an ideology; 
an ideology, which restricts and 
persecutes what counts as 
legitimate work.   
The kinds of pronouncements 
we criticise as ideological and 
restricting are commonly seen in 
the editorial statements of many 
academic management journals.  
As Bartunek and Rynes (2010) 
show, most of the world’s leading 
management journals require 
articles to be relevant to practice; 
similar conditions are also 
commonly imposed upon grant-
holders by research funders 
(Learmonth and Harding, 2006).  
As we have drawn heavily on 
debates about the relevance of 
scholarship that appear in the 
Academy of Management Journal 
(AMJ) we have taken its guidance 
to authors as an illustrative 
example of the problems such 
statements raise: 
 
All articles published in the 
Academy of Management Journal 
must also be relevant to 
practice. The best submissions 
are those that identify both a 
compelling management issue 
and a strong theoretical 
framework for addressing it. We 
realize that practical relevance 
may be rather indirect in some 
cases; however, authors should 
be as specific as possible about 
potential implications (2011; no 
page number; emphasis in 
original). 
 
Even though it is the case that 
authors often include no explicit 
recommendations for practice 
(Bartenuk and Rynes, 2010), we 
still think this kind of 
representation of relevance is 
dangerous for two interrelated 
reasons.  The first danger is that 
the guidance reinforces and 
legitimates the conventional view 
of relevance which we have 
critiqued in this paper – it appears 
to conceive of relevance as linear, 
essentialist and technical.  There is 
no hint that what counts as 
usefulness might be complex, 
contestable or value-laden as we 
have argued – even though a 
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simple addition (perhaps: ‘articles 
... must also be relevant to 
practice’ in some way) would be 
all that is required to hint towards 
such possibilities.  Instead, we find 
the claim that ‘practical relevance 
may be rather indirect in some 
cases’.  In our reading, such a 
claim works to reinforce the 
implication that what constitutes 
relevance is conceptually 
unproblematic.  It suggests that 
relevance is simply what managers 
would find helpful; acknowledging 
only that its attainment is 
(sometimes) difficult in the context 
of advancing complex new 
theories. Implicit in this statement, 
then, are unexamined values and 
ideologies that suggest 
conservative ideas about the sorts 
of research we should be doing.  
Rather than opening up new 
possibilities for rethinking what 
might be useful, the guidance 
seems to reinforce received ideas 
about what we are doing when we 
do management research.  We are 
not invited to reflect deeply upon 
why we might be involved in 
management scholarship, nor 
upon how our work fits in to the 
wider power relations within 
organizations and society more 
broadly. 
The second danger we see with 
the guidance is the place AMJ 
occupies within the power 
relations that underpin scholarly 
production in business schools.  
As one of the most prestigious 
management journals in the world, 
how AMJ’s editors view relevance 
and usefulness is important to the 
scholarly community – as scholars, 
a major part of our influence is the 
impact of the journals in which our 
work appears.  In parallel with 
those who control researching 
funding bodies then, people like 
AMJ’s editors have power to make 
their assumptions about relevance 
count.  Indeed, in the face of such 
power, however much we might 
wish to reimagine relevance, 
reimagining it is made significantly 
more difficult.  This is because we 
may face having to compromise 
what we really want to say in order 
to conform to editors’ (or funders’) 
ideological commitments about the 
relevance and usefulness of our 
work (Learmonth, 2008). 
This insight, however, brings us 
to another implication of the 
contingent nature of usefulness.  
That is, highlighting its 
contingency tends to recast 
debates about relevance within the 
business school.  It moves us away 
from (apparently) technical 
questions: e.g. “how can we be 
more relevant?” towards questions 
more explicitly concerned with 
power and politics: e.g. “whose 
interests do we want to be useful 
to?”  A stress on the contingent 
nature of usefulness, in other 
words, suggests a focus for 
debating the kind of business 
schools we want to be part of – in 
terms of the values for which we 
stand and the interests that we 
serve.   
Thus, we are not saying 
scholarship that matters only 
happens by questioning orthodox 
ideas; nor that it only gets 
produced when our work 
deliberately sets out to be received 
as useless.   What we are 
suggesting, however, is that we 
need to move more reflexively 
towards debating the 
fundamentals underlying what we 
are doing when we do research. By 
promoting reflexivity we want to 
stimulate academics to think 
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through their motivations and 
interests in conducting research.  
Of course, such reflexive 
exercises will always have their 
blind spots, as Tatli (2011) rightly 
points out.  However, we do not 
feel it appropriate “to provide 
explanations for and solutions to” 
(Tatli, 2011, p.8) the sorts of 
fundamental questions we pose 
here.  Rather, our arguments 
suggest the need to nurture wider 
debate about the values and 
ideologies within business school 
scholarship (Currie, Starkey and 
Knights, 2010; Reedy and 
Learmonth, 2009) in the context of 
debates about usefulness and 
relevance.  This is because the 
increasing reliance on taken-for-
granted assumptions about 
usefulness and relevance tends to 
do the opposite – to close down 
debate and obscure the power 
relationships which underlie what 
has come to count as useful in the 
first place. Indeed, should 
usefulness continue to be seen as 
an unproblematic good that 
researchers and educators aim for 
without examining the 
assumptions that underlie their 
thinking, then “usefulness” will, 
most likely, lead to business 
schools’ (and business’s) long-term 
decline and stagnation.  
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